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Abstract 
Since the early 1950s Latin American countries have made systematic efforts to foster regional 
transactions. Nevertheless, the indicators of relative importance of regional trade remain well below 
the corresponding figures in other regions. This paper argues that a process of integration should take 
into account the differences between what can be achieved by negotiating with closer neighbours and 
with geographically distant partners. Also, at present there is an increasing competition from Asian 
goods, which have negatively affected Latin American producers. Among the lessons from the recent 
Asian experience are the economic links among countries that have helped to improve competitiveness 
as well as to foster the degree of convergence of the GDP growth rates of the participating countries. 
Keywords 
Regional integration, productive complementarity, competitiveness and trade barriers. 
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I. Introduction* 
Since the early 1950s Latin American countries have made systematic efforts to foster regional 
transactions. Notwithstanding this long tradition the indicators of relative importance of regional trade 
remain well below the corresponding figures in other regions. 
One possible reason why things did not go as expected may be the efforts to deal in a homogeneous 
way with different actors. Regional preferences are not necessarily a homogeneous process. One can 
hardly expect that all countries in the region will adhere to the same level of political commitment 
with regard to regional integration. Geographical proximity determines the levels of integration that 
can be achieved. This means that for Latin America as a whole it should be expected that various 
forms of agreements will hold (other than free-trade), in accordance to ´variable geometry`: different 
sets of countries can jointly adopt different negotiating agendas, different perspectives with regard to 
productive complementarity and different mechanisms of monetary cooperation. 
This is, of course, a proposition that is challenged by the Western European experience, where all 
the latecomers had to adhere to the same pre-existing institutions and rules. But it can be argued that 
even in Europe the process started with the original ´six` and only gradually there was a geographical 
spread. And even so some of the common issues, like the common currency, are not universally 
adopted, for geographic or other reasons. 
If distance matters, it remains to discuss what can be actually expected from geographically distant 
partners and what can be achieved among geographically close economies. 
In both cases the benefits stemming from preferential treatment are associated to diversifying the 
export composition, increasing the stability of foreign exchange revenues and improving the 
technological content of production. But the results vary as a function of the distance between the 
potential partners. 
Take, for instance, the case of two geographically distant countries, such as Brazil and Mexico. The 
Automobile Agreement between these two countries has fostered bilateral trade at an unprecedented 
pace. This means that improving market access conditions is likely to provide new opportunities for 
bilateral trade. This does not mean, however, that one can expect to promote a significant convergence 
of productive processes in the two countries. The same thing applies for, say, preferential agreements 
between the US and Israel. 
Geographical distance affects the likeliness of adopting, for instance, common external tariffs as 
well as increases the difficulties for the movement of parts and components between productive plants. 
And because there are no common external barriers, the net gains are probably higher than the risks of 
losses, given that the margin for trade diversion is low. 
A different set of possibilities can be related to deepening regional commitment with neighbouring 
countries. As a matter of fact, the potential in this case is so much higher that one can question 
whether the purposes of the integration process comprise: a) essentially business facilitation; b) further 
steps towards fostering productive complementarity or even c) a means to reach not only economic, 
but also political, social and cultural joint objectives.  
In Latin America the motives for promoting regional integration have changed over time. The 
emphasis in regional agreements as a policy tool has varied quite significantly, with a recent boom 
from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, but at present this has been challenged by a number of features 
of the international scenario.  
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The weakening of multilateral negotiations and the multiplicity of bilateral agreements with 
countries in other regions might affect regional trade both via trade diversion and through investment 
decisions. International capital movement might affect exchange rates and output growth, hence 
influence trade. At the same time the need for new, broader negotiating agenda, from simply dealing 
with trade issues to taking into consideration topics not directly related to trade increases the 
difficulties in designing integration strategies. Even more so if the group of countries that aim at 
integrating their economies present markedly different characteristics.  
There are at present more challenges than ever to the integration processes in the region. Regional 
integration is neither something automatically desirable nor a sufficient condition to promote 
economic and social development. The very lack of clarity in identifying for what purpose a country 
should enter (or remain in) an integration process not only may impair the negotiating process but also 
influences the degree of success that might be obtained from this mechanism. 
To the above elements one should add that at present there is sharp and increasing competition 
from Asian goods, whose process of production involves the participation of several countries in that 
region, and which have affected Latin American producers both via an increasing share of the 
domestic markets as well as via the diversion of Latin American exports (mostly industrialized 
products) to traditional markets. 
This paper deals with these elements in six sections. Following this introduction the second section 
shows that the rationale for promoting regional integration has changed over time in Latin America. 
This is followed by a third section where the benefits accruing from regional integration are evaluated. 
It is argued that there are actually differences between what can be achieved by negotiating with closer 
neighbours and with geographically distant partners. Distance matters. In the fourth section it is shown 
that tighter economic links among Asian countries have helped to improve their competitiveness as 
well as to improve the degree of convergence of the GDP growth rates of the participating countries. 
The fifth section discusses some peculiarities of the exports of manufactured goods. The Latin 
American experience is seen through the Brazilian experience with product and market diversification 
in the last thirty years, as compared to India and China. It is also shown that several Brazilian exports 
face tariff barriers that are higher than those adopted between each other BRIC and its neighbouring 
countries. The sixth and final section brings some final remarks. 
II. The Changing Rationale for Regional Integration in the Americas 
The idea of creating a common market to facilitate industrialisation in the region – by means of 
enlarging the domestic markets and therefore allowing for gains from productive plants of larger scale 
– has been present in the reasoning about regional integration by some think tanks such as 
UN/ECLAC (the UN/Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) since the late 
1940s. 
The first steps towards this idea were taken in Central America, where already in the early 1950s 
the basis for what later became the CACM (Central American Common Market) was established. In 
the 1950s and 1960s the perspective of recurrent balance of payments disequilibria, reducing the 
access to imported capital goods, required for making viable the priority given to industrialisation, 
reinforced the demand for regional integration. Trade preferences should be granted gradually, so as 
not to disturb the (limited) access to capital goods. Moreover, those preferences should be granted to 
the highest possible number of countries in the region, with differential treatment given to smaller 
economies. This reasoning became the basis for the creation – in 1960 – of LAFTA. 
The 1970s were a period of very low interest in regional integration in Latin America. Difficulties 
comprised the payment constraints following the first oil shock, limitations imposed by the decision 
process in LAFTA and – no less important – the fact that several countries in the region had military 
governments, not quite prone to make concessions that affect national sovereignty. 
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The second oil crisis plus the debt crisis imposed a shortage of foreign currencies to most Latin 
American countries. Reduced trade performance, coupled to idle capacity in some countries and 
excess demand in others led to regional integration gaining momentum in the political agenda of the 
region since the mid-1980s. 
In this new era regional integration was seen as not only a means to widen domestic markets and 
allowing for scale gains, but it also proved a way out of crises: regional trade makes it possible in the 
short run to use installed capacity, and clearing schedules adopted by central banks in the region 
allowed for regional trade with less need of scarce foreign currencies. Furthermore, in the long run 
what makes integration sustainable is not the unlimited elimination of trade barriers, but rather the 
efforts to complement productive structures, so integration exercises should be seen as also a tool for 
the creation of common economic spaces. Lastly, because the renewed interest in regional integration 
took place at the same time that most economies adopted more liberal trade policies as a means to 
fight inflation, not only the integration processes should be designed in such a way to be compatible 
with multilateral opening (the so-called ‘open regionalism’, with regional agreements being ‘building 
blocks’ to multilateralism), but exports to neighbouring countries should be seen as a ‘learning 
process’, by which producers could gain experience that would later make them able to try and explore 
more sophisticated markets. 
The 1990s – the ‘decade of the reforms’ in Latin America – added new arguments to those already 
listed. The economic reasoning in the 90s stressed competitiveness. There are additional benefits 
stemming from regional integration in that it allows for the reduction of unproductive rents related to 
lack of competitiveness, affects expectations of domestic and foreign investors, reduces transaction 
costs, increases productive efficiency, therefore contributing to price stability and facilitating the 
absorption of technical progress by stimulating less vertical productive processes, sub-contracting of 
smaller firms and the employment of qualified workers. The liberalisation of regional trade should 
also provide support to intra-industry specialisation, given that the products traded within the region 
tend to be more technology-intensive than the exports to the rest of the world. According to the new 
thinking, the benefits of integration go even further, by affecting positively the economic and 
institutional environment: joint infrastructure projects, as well as joint initiatives in areas such as 
education and development of capital markets have widespread effects. 
There were, hence, in the 1950s, 1960s, 1980s and 1990s clearly identifiable arguments in favour 
of policies stimulating regional integration. In the new century, differently, new overall conditions 
impose a challenge in trying to identify clear arguments for integration.  
First, the outcome of trade concessions is affected by the international movement of capital; hence 
trade liberalisation cannot be thought of independently of the policies towards the capital account. 
This is particularly relevant in a context such as the Latin American, where there has been little if any 
macroeconomic coordination. 
Second, regional negotiations (the regional agenda) should go beyond the trade dimension: there is 
an increasing need to deal, for instance, with development financing and infrastructure themes, such as 
energy, environmental policies and water supply, not to speak of measures to improve financial 
cooperation. What is not clear, however, is which non-trade topics should be included in the 
negotiations. The perception of what is relevant and what is a sensible issue in this regard varies 
substantially among different economies.  
Third, international negotiations are in every country an attribute of the executive power, the one 
with the means, structure and empowerment to carry out such negotiations. Reaching agreement 
between two countries is easier on areas related to the executive power than reaching convergence on 
subjects that concern the legislative and the judiciary. In part as a result of this difficulty having been 
perceived by several agents in recent years there has been an increasing demand by representatives of 
the legislative and judiciary powers to participate (ex-ante) in the negotiation process. At least in one 
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case (Mercosur) there are a significant number of issues that have been agreed among partners but not 
effectively implemented, due to domestic normative barriers.  
Be it as it may, the record of regional integration in Latin America in the years 2000s show 
relatively slow progress. There are mainly weak (or inexistent) institutions, especially with regard to 
efficient dispute settlements mechanisms, an overall absence of macroeconomic coordination, limited 
treatment of asymmetries and of non-trade disciplines, all of which provides relatively low credibility 
to the integration purposes. 
This is due in part to the fact that regional integration takes place in parallel to an increasing 
number of extra-regional preferential agreements. It is also due to the fact that – given the ambitious 
negotiating agenda in several exercises, comprising themes that do not traditionally belong to 
integration processes, such as consumer rights, government procurement, competition policies and 
others – the domestic political environment in several countries is not compatible with the concessions 
required to foster integration processes.  
Given these obstacles, what are the external conditions that might influence the outcome of 
integration exercises in the present decade? To start with, the high mobility of international capital, in 
a context where most countries have opened both their trade and capital accounts, is a major element 
affecting bilateral exchange rates, therefore determining trade flows and output growth, hence the 
expectations of potential investors as well.  
Second, infrastructure themes (energy, transportation and communication in particular) have to be 
considered, should Latin American policy-makers intend to sustain output growth rates and foster 
economic and social development. That brings about the related theme of long-term financing. These 
are issues that go well beyond the traditional agenda based on trade concessions.  
Third, the weakening of the WTO, in parallel to the mushrooming of bilateral and plurilateral 
agreements imposes a challenge to regional preferences in that they increase the probability of trade 
diversion, negatively affecting regional trade. As a consequence, it reduces the margin for exploiting 
the potential these regional agreements might provide as a tool to foster economic development via 
changes in the productive structure. 
Fourth, the emergence of new actors in the international scenario (like some Asian countries), in 
parallel to the weakening of some industrialized economies, raises the perspective of a new 
‘policentrism’ in international economic and political relations. This increases the list of ‘natural 
candidates’ that Latin American countries should look for in their selection of potential partners for 
bilateral agreements. To the extent that recent agreements involve themes that go beyond purely trade 
subjects, the approximation with different partners at the same time might have damaging effects on a 
given group of countries participating in the same regional initiative.  
Fifth, agreements negotiated by each country individually with third parties might deal with one 
same subject in different ways, leading to different rules than those prevailing within the regional 
agreements.  
It is, therefore, less clear in the present decade, as compared to previous periods, what each group 
of countries can expect from regional preferential agreements. It is not an easy task within each 
country individually to identify the national motivation to adhere to a given integration exercise. It is 
even more difficult to reach consensus among economies with different perspectives with regard to 
their participation in the international scenario. This is one of the major shortcomings in designing the 
trajectories for integration exercises and hence one of the major obstacles to exploiting the potential 
changes in the economic structure that theory would allow us to expect from regional integration.  
Depending on how they are designed regional agreements can be considered as an escape valve to a 
failing multilateral system. But they can also be ‘building’ or ‘stumbling’ blocks to the multilateral 
system. Betting on trade agreements as a means to live in a world with missing multilateral trade rules 
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might be a risky option, as overall disciplines might be replaced by bilateral pressure. Perspectives of a 
failure of the Doha Round have already led to a booming of preferential trade agreements. The 
remaining question is, however, to what extent these agreements are sufficient conditions to foster 
trade.  
Volatility of capital flows is indeed a matter for concern. In a situation where it has become clear 
that supervision at the financial centres are not as efficient as one would have thought and expected it 
to be, and even more, in a context where new players (such as sovereign funds) are having an 
increasingly important role, this poses a challenge to macroeconomic policies in developing 
economies. This seems to be an argument for monetary coordination, eventually with the formation of 
common funds to provide liquidity in emergency situations. A quite different role than, say, 
constituting regional development financing agencies, a dimension more closely linked to fostering 
‘regional economic spaces’.  
What these different aspects lead to is an overall scenario where it has become increasingly 
challenging for policy-makers and negotiators to clearly identify the political targets and the actual 
means to reach them via regional agreements. One possible way out of this lack of clarity is the 
adoption of ´variable geometry` as a strategic approach. Next section discusses in a more systematic 
way what might be the benefits accruing from regional agreements and emphasizes the differences of 
these outcomes as a function of the geographical distance among the partner countries. 
III. The benefits from regional agreements 
The benefits often associated to regional agreements can be classified in three groups: a) those 
associated to trade flows and the effects on the productive structure; b) those associated to domestic 
policies c) those associated to the foreign policies of the participating countries. 
The first group of effects – on trade and domestic production - comprise: 
i) direct effects associated to foreign trade 
competition with products from neighbouring countries, traded under tariff preferences, induces 
producers in third countries to practice lower prices on the domestic markets of the 
participating countries. As a consequence there are terms of trade gains for the participating 
countries  
ii) effects on the domestic production process 
ii.1 the enlarged market allows for the consolidation of firms of bigger size, eventually 
allowing for gains from scale; at the same time, increased competition reduces domestic prices  
ii.2 competition allows for the reduction of productive inefficiencies, inducing firms to focus 
on specific market segments  
ii.3 firms can decide the allocation of their productive activities as a function of factor costs; 
those countries with better infrastructure and qualified labour force are likely to gain a 
competitive edge. As a result there is a healthy competition among countries in order to 
increase competitiveness.  
iii) effects on investment 
regional agreements improve the access to a broader market, with better productive 
rationalization and hence a higher potential to generate returns to investment. This stimulates 
investments by both external and domestic investors  
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The second group of effects – associated to domestic policies - comprise: 
i) effects on domestic political reforms 
signing external agreements can be a relevant tool for governments to implement domestic 
measures that would otherwise be politically difficult to adopt. Some examples are tariff 
reforms, policies towards foreign investors, the privatization of public firms and others. This 
obviously assumes that economic agents have a clear perception of long term gains in 
pertaining to an integration exercise that surpass the short term social costs 
ii) effects from signalling the direction of economic and institutional policies  
short term costs of adhering to a regional exercise might be seen as excessively high. 
Nevertheless, a country might opt to adhere to that exercise if it considers that in so doing it 
signals to potential investors with favourable perspectives, such as macroeconomic equilibrium 
and initiatives to foster competitiveness 
The third group of effects – those linked to external policies – comprise: 
i) ‘prophylactic` effects 
belonging to a group of countries should allow for each country to increase its security in 
relation to various external shocks. Asymmetric shocks in terms of trade, for instance, can in 
principle be avoided or reduced when there are agreements among countries. The recent Asian 
experience with the provision of regional liquidity is one example.  
ii) external negotiating capacity 
once a set of countries reaches convergence in their positions about relevant subjects the very 
fact that they negotiate as a group give them not only higher visibility but also a stronger 
negotiating capacity. The Mercosur experience in a number of negotiations is one example.  
iii) effects on security 
belonging to a group of countries not only changes the trade and investment flows among them; 
it also creates inter-dependency among the participating countries. This should contribute to 
reduce the risks of trade and military conflicts, as they are more likely replaced by cooperation 
mechanisms.  
In view of this listing of potential consequences of regional integration processes, it remains to 
identify the differences between what can be expected from an approximation of geographically 
distant and neighbouring economies. 
From the perspective of geographically distant countries it seems more likely that the economic 
convergence will take place via preferential trade agreements rather than via common trade barriers: 
notwithstanding other reasons, suffice it to mention the difficulty to control the observation of rules of 
origin in distant markets.  
If so, one can expect that for distant partners one might more likely obtain the set of effects 
identified above as the first set of benefits stemming from trade flows, and more specifically items (i) 
and (ii) in that group. The third set of effects, on investment, is little more than a possibility, 
depending upon the format of the agreement and the relative importance of the participating 
economies. 
Distant countries could also benefit from the effects of regional agreements on the reform of 
domestic policies and possibly also on policy signalling. Once again, this would be a function of their 
importance in the international scenario, as well as the relative weight of regional in total trade. 
Finally, in spite of the distance among the negotiation countries, some benefits might accrue from 
cooperation in monetary and financial issues. 
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In summary, distant economies can aim at the benefits from more intense trade flows, from an 
increase in the degrees of freedom to adopt some domestic policies and from financial cooperation. 
But it seems that expectations can hardly go far beyond this. 
As different from these, the whole list of benefits presented above can be expected to apply in the 
case of neighbouring countries. There is margin for promoting a much stronger degree of integration 
among the participating countries. 
Closer countries can expect, hence, to achieve a more complex set of direct and indirect benefits 
from integration efforts. As a matter of fact, as the next section will show, there is a case for 
advocating the deepening of regional productive complementarity, on the basis of recent experience 
elsewhere. This, of course, is assumed to be feasible among countries that are geographically close.  
IV. Productive Complementarity 
Productive complementarity among neighbour countries can be an important tool in fostering 
competitiveness. A comparison between the recent experiences of Latin America and Asia is 
illustrative. 
Asia (East Asia, mostly) is a rich example of intense regional trade with only a few formal trade 
agreements, and emphasis on a ´mostly business only` approach, without political dimensions. 
Asian trade is led by a few big economies. This allows for an analytical scheme stressing the trade 
relations between the big (´hub`) economies and the smaller (´spoke`) countries in each region. We 
consider as Asian hubs China, Japan, India and South Korea, and evaluate its trade with 12 ´spoke` 
countries
1
. In Latin America the ´hubs` are Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, and 14 ´spoke` countries 
were considered
2
. 
In Asia there is clearly a ´regional multiplier`: the smaller economies export ´producer goods`
3
 to 
the bigger economies and import ´final goods` from them. There is, hence, a virtuous cycle where both 
types of countries gain.  
                                                     
1
 More detailed analysis can be found in R.Baumann (2010), Regional Trade and Growth in Asia and Latin America: the 
importance of Productive Complementarity, CEPAL, Brasilia Office, LC/BRS/R238, available in www.cepal.org/brasil. 
The Asian ´spokes` are: Bangladesh, Indonesia, Hong Kong SAR China, Malaysia, Mongolia, Pakistan, Philippines, 
Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, China, Thailand and Vietnam. 
2
 Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, 
Uruguay and Venezuela. 
3
 The set of producer goods comprise not only capital goods, but also parts, components and raw material, that is, those 
goods that are consumed in the process of production. This obtains from an ´ad hoc` list of 1919 5-digit products, as 
shown in Baumann (2010), op.cit. 
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In Latin America regional trade has taken place in a ´wrong direction`: the ´hub` countries export 
´production goods` to the ´spoke` countries and import primary products from them. The ´spoke` 
countries, on their turn, divert a significant share of their demand for imports of final goods toward 
suppliers elsewhere. This is hardly a dynamic relationship. 
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Trade in Asia is far more integrated than in Latin America and the (high) share of ´production goods` 
in regional trade
4
 has had an impact on regional growth. In the last two decades GDP growth in Asia 
has become far more homogeneous than in the early 1990s, according to Graph 1. 
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At the same time, as shown in Graph 2, for Central America, the Andeans and Mercosur we obtain a 
very low degree of homogeneity, with almost no changes throughout the whole period. 
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These results are even more impressive when we take into account the fact that during most of this 
period several leading economies in Asia have increased their gross production at a very rapid pace – 
in some cases at two-digits per cent per year – and the region as a whole has suffered significant terms 
of trade losses.  
In Latin America, on the other hand, there were correspondingly impressive terms of trade gains 
(mostly in South America) and the overall GDP growth took place at very low rates: in principle a set 
of favourable circumstances to reduce the economic distance among the various economies. Yet the 
                                                     
4
 To be shown in Section V. 
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limited degree of interaction among economies has contributed to freeze the economic distance 
between the bigger and the smaller economies. 
The Asian recent experience is an example and a challenge to competing producers. It is also an 
opportunity that might help Latin American countries to identify an economic reason why to foster 
regional trade so as to direct the regional negotiating process.  
As shown in Section II, between the 1950s and the 1990s there were some clearly identifiable 
economic arguments that justified the efforts to foster regional economic relations. Since the early 
2000s, however, Latin American economies became more open to trade and to capital movements. 
Global financial movements have affected exchange rates to an extent that has proved to be beyond 
the reach of domestic policies, and having strong impacts on regional trade. The region has shown 
hardly any significant initiative to promote monetary and financial cooperation. 
At the same time, the region as a whole has shown low dynamism in the exports of non-primary 
products and a strong reliance upon the regional market for the exports of manufactures, but has been 
experiencing strong competition from the imports of industrial goods produced elsewhere. 
A good deal of these imported manufactures is produced in several countries, according to a model 
of global value chains. Yet in Latin America one hardly finds a significant concern with promoting 
productive complementarity so as to improve competitiveness. The next section discusses the issue of 
exports of manufactures. 
V. Exports of Manufactures 
Fostering manufactured exports is not an easy task. The international market for manufactures has its 
most dynamic poles for both production and consumption centred in three regions: East Asia, North 
America and Western Europe. 
East Asia has been in the last decades the most dynamic exporter and comprises a number of 
developing economies, like Latin America. In what follows we consider this region as a competing 
supplier and analyse the Latin America experience with focus on the Brazilian experience. 
Brazil presents the double characteristic of being a potential ´hub` in Latin America, at the same 
time that it belongs to the BRICS, the group of emerging economies considered to have significant 
potential, thanks to their geographical, demographic and economic sizes. 
These five economies have, with different intensities, exploited trade relations with their 
neighbouring countries. East Asian countries in particular are well known to have developed joint 
productive capacity, the source of a ´regional multiplier` that has helped to increase the degree of 
homogeneity of GDP growth rates in the region, thus consolidating the competitiveness of one of the 
BRICS, China. As a consequence, the other economies in this group have experienced an increasing 
inflow of Asian products, by and large an outcome of this regional productive complementarity in East 
Asia.  
This complementarity can be explained not only by specific political decisions, but it is also based 
on the actual competitive advantages of those countries, coupled to differentiated trade preferences. 
This raises the fear that regional trade preferences might provoke trade diversion, negatively affecting 
the competitiveness of products originating from other regions. 
In such an environment even significant increases in competitiveness in the export sector might not 
be sufficient to overcome the differentiated conditions imposed by lower transportation costs – given 
the geographical proximity of the countries within a region – and by the trade preferences granted on a 
regional basis. 
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What challenges such a scenario imposes to an economy such as the Brazilian, which has 
experienced a significant inflow of imported products, but which at the same time presents a quite 
limited degree of productive integration with neighbour countries, an alternative that might contribute 
to reduce production costs? 
The BRICS are natural candidates for more intense market exploitation by Brazilian exporters, 
given their until recently exceptional dynamism. This could contribute to reduce trade disequilibria in 
some sectors, such as manufacturing. But this strategy relies upon the actual access to these markets. 
Economic convergence among the BRICS is not easy, due to a number of factors.  
There are marked differences in trade performance among these countries. Compare, for instance, 
manufactured exports by Brazil, China and India in the last three decades. Two dimensions are 
relevant for the analysis: the geographical destination of exports and the type of products
5
. 
When two points in time are considered traded goods can be classified as
6
 i) Continued – those 
products that were exported in both periods; or ii) New – those products exported only in the second 
period (newly added items to the export bill)
7
. Table 1 shows the indicators for Brazil. 
 
Table 1 - Brazil – Growth (%) of Manufactured Exports 
 1983-1985 / 1993-1995 1993-1995 / 2007-2009 
 Continued New Continued New 
Latin America 37,5 4,3 33,7 0,0 
USA 14,9 2,9 14,2 0,2 
European 
Union 
13,9 5,3 25,2 0,7 
China + 
Japan 
0,0 4,1 3,5 0,6 
Developing 
Countries 
35,9 4,6 37,7 0,0 
Source: Baumann/Ceratti, op.cit. 
Brazil has relied upon the regional market as well as on developing economies for ¾ of the growth of 
its manufactured exports in the last three decades: it is hardly competitive in the main markets, so they 
account for only a limited percentage of the growth of manufactured exports. 
  
                                                     
5
 More detailed analysis is presented in R.Baumann, R.Ceratti (2012), Trade Among BRICS: Still a Bumping Road from a 
Brazilian Perspective, to be published in Revista de Economia Política.  
6
 Following Simon J. Evenett, Anthony J. Venables (2002), Export Growth By Developing Countries: Market Entry and 
Bilateral Trade, mimeo, in www.nottingham.ac.uk/shared/shared_levents/conferences/2002_june_everett.pdf 
7
 Needless to say, this paper sets aside those (´Dead`) products that were exported only in the first period. 
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Different outcomes are found in the same indicators for India and China, as shown in Tables 2 and 3: 
 
Table 2 - India – Growth (%) of Manufactured Exports 
 1983-1985 / 1993-1995 1993-1995 / 2007-2009 
 Continued New Continued New 
South Asia 3,5 0,5 2,4 0,6 
USA 19,0 0,8 14,8 0,4 
European 
Union 
25,6 2,2 22,9 0,7 
Asia Total 27,0 2,7 20,7 0,5 
Developing 
Countries 
7,8 1,7 10,4 0,7 
Source: Baumann/Ceratti, op.cit. 
As explained in Baumann/Ceratti (2012), these estimates were made at the 5-digit level of product 
classification, from the UN/COMTRADE Database. There were no data available for the first period 
for China; hence the following table shows only data for the second period. 
 
Table 3 - China – Growth (%) of 
Manufactured Exports 
 1993-1995 / 2007-2009 
 Continued New 
East Asia 15,6 0,0 
USA 17,8 0,1 
European 
Union 
20,9 0,4 
Asia Total 33,4 0,0 
Developing 
Countries 
9,2 0,1 
Source: Baumann/Ceratti, op.cit. 
What these tables suggest is that Brazil has opted during no less than fifty years (starting in the mid-
1960s with the first incentives to exporters) for emphasis in the regional market for its exports of 
manufactures. It has over time achieved quite low participation in the most competitive markets and 
limited product diversification. 
India and China, differently, have started their export promotion activities in the late 1990s, being 
latecomers in the industrial export activity. Yet their trajectory is remarkably different from the 
Brazilian, in that they explored the most competitive markets since the very beginning and have 
achieved more significant presence in those markets.  
There are also differences in the relations between the BRICS and their neighbouring countries. As 
Table 4 shows, these regional trade links are far more intense in the case of China. 
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Table 4 - BRICS – Relative Importance (%) of Regional Trade  
 Exports Imports 
 2005 2010 2005 2010 
Brazil 17,9 18,6 14,6 14,3 
Russia 13,4 14,9 18,2 12,7 
India 4,4 4,0 0,7 0,4 
China 39,1 34,4 40,1 34,5 
S.Africa 10,1 11,3 2,1 4,1 
Source: processed from primary data on UN/COMTRADE database 
These indicators refer to total trade flows. A more relevant appraisal – as far as competitiveness is 
concerned - is associated to those items related to the productive process. Taking into consideration all 
the ´producer goods` traded, that is, the set of capital goods, parts, components and raw-material, it 
turns out that the regional trade in these items is far more important in China, as shown in the Table 5. 
 
Table 5 - BRICS – Relative Importance (%) of Regional Trade in ´Producer 
Goods` 
 Exports Imports 
 2005 2010 2005 2010 
Brazil 28,2 38,0 9,5 9,3 
Russia 31,9 15,8 11,9 9,4 
India 6,9 6,8 1,3 0,7 
China 22,3 20,4 49,2 44,2 
S.Africa 20,2 8,1 1,1 0,9 
Source: processed from primary data on UN/COMTRADE database 
There are four standards among these five countries, as far as regional trade in ´producer goods` in 
concerned.  
According to Table 5, Russia has reduced substantially its trade in these products with its 
neighbours. For India and South Africa the regional market for producer goods is rather unimportant 
and has actually reduced its weight between 2005 and 2010.  
For Brazil the regional market is increasingly important as a destination for its exports of producer 
goods, but relatively irrelevant for its imports of these products. China presents – once again – a 
peculiar standard, as its neighbours account for almost half of its imports of producer goods. There is 
an intense degree of productive complementarity, which fosters the competitiveness of Chinese 
exports. 
This high complementarity in East Asia between China and its neighbours is due in part to the 
comparative advantages these countries have in the production of manufactures. Table 6 shows the 
estimates of Balassa´s index of comparative advantages for the five BRICS, for each (one-digit) SITC 
Chapter.  
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Table 6 - BRICS - Indexes of Revealed Comparative Advantage 
2010 
Chapter Brazil Russia India China S.Africa 
  
    
  
0 3,99 0,29 1,22 0,45 1,16 
1 1,84 0,22 0,58 0,15 2,16 
2 6,46 0,77 1,70 0,18 4,43 
3 0,75 4,79 1,28 0,13 0,75 
4 1,50 0,28 0,65 0,05 0,39 
5 0,55 0,36 0,95 0,49 0,63 
6 0,90 0,87 2,16 1,20 2,62 
7 0,48 0,08 0,42 1,42 0,54 
8 0,22 0,06 1,13 2,19 0,22 
9 0,18 2,19 0,40 0,02 0,07 
Source: processed from primary data on UN/COMTRADE database 
It is clear that – as different from the other four countries – China has most of its comparative 
advantages concentrated on chapters 6 to 8, which correspond to the strict definition of manufactures. 
Most of other BRICS are competitive in natural resources-intensive products
8
. 
The same is true for China´s neighbours: the smaller economies in East Asia are also competitive in 
producer goods, both in the regional as well as in the global market. They are often more competitive 
than the bigger economies in that region. Graphs 3 and 4 show the trajectories, since the early 1990s.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: processed from primary data on UN/COMTRADE database 
This high share of ´producer goods` in regional trade is not exclusively explained by comparative 
advantages of the participating countries. Complementary dynamism in East Asia is also helped by 
differentiated tariff preferences.  
These different conditions for market access have affected the exports from other BRICS. For 
instance, Brazilian products are relatively penalized in their access to the Chinese market by being 
charged higher import tariffs than their competitors from East Asian smaller economies. Also, Chinese 
products pay lower tariffs than their Brazilian competitors in the markets of smaller East Asian 
countries. Tables 7 and 8 illustrate this point. 
  
                                                     
8
 Even the manufactures in chapter 6, where India and South Africa obtain high indexes. 
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Table 7 - Number of Products on which other BRICS charge tariffs equal to or higher 
  than the tariffs charged on Brazilian products     
    
 
  Higher tariffs on    
BRIC Partner Equal Tariffs   
Brazilian 
products   
China Indonesia 163   
 
831   
  Japan 1380   
  
  
  Malaysia 168   
 
903   
  Mongolia 63   
  
  
  Philippines 126   
 
605   
  Singapore 156   
 
972   
  Thailand 179   
 
971   
India Maldives     
 
2   
  Pakistan 101   
 
26   
  Sri Lanka 64   
 
214   
Russia Armenia 187   
  
  
  Azerbaijan 102   
  
  
  Kazakhstan 215   
  
  
  Tajikistan 68   
  
  
  Turkmenistan 73   
  
  
  Ukraine 737   
  
  
  Uzbekistan 275   
  
  
South Africa Angola 99   
 
68   
  Botswana 1   
 
3   
  Lesotho     
 
7   
  Madagascar 188   
  
  
  Malawi 152   
 
174   
  Mauritius 163   
 
220   
  Mozambique 172   
 
165   
  Namibia 8   
 
7   
  Seychelles 44   
 
29   
  Swaziland 10   
 
2   
  Zambia 220   
 
227   
  Zimbabwe 196     278   
Source: Baumann/Ceratti (2012), op.cit. 
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Source: Baumann/Ceratti (2012), op.cit. 
This preferential treatment has been found to affect the performance of Brazilian exports to these 
markets between 2005 and 2010: quantitative exercise (see Baumann/Ceratti (2012)) has shown that 
the growth of Brazilian exports to each other BRIC is positively associated to Brazilian comparative 
advantages (the actual level of the index of comparative advantages, its increase between the two 
years, and its difference to the comparative advantages of the BRICS´s neighbours), and negatively 
associated to the difference between the tariffs charged on Brazilian products and those charged on the 
products from each BRIC´S neighbour. 
This means that the increased preference margins granted on regional trade has contributed to 
facilitate productive complementarity and hence led to more homogeneous GDP growth. But at the 
same time has induced a ´trade diversion` of some sort, negatively affecting the competitiveness of 
Brazilian manufactured products to those markets. 
This raises (at least) two political issues: a) it will soon be necessary to make trade policies part of 
the agenda among BRICS, so far a very sensitive issue and b) there is a clear need to stimulate 
productive complementarity among Latin American countries, so as to face external competition in a 
more competitive way. 
Table 8 - Number of Products on which each BRIC´s neighbour 
charges  
 equal or higher tariffs on Brazilian products in comparison   
 to the tariffs charged on the 
products of the corresponding 
BRIC 
     
  
Country BRIC   
Equal 
Tariff 
Higher 
Tariff 
Indonesia China   75 
 
353   
Japan 
 
  813 
 
    
Philippines 
 
  543 
 
    
Singapore 
 
  876 
 
    
  
 
  
  
    
Sri Lanka India   62 
 
60   
  
 
  
  
    
Belarus Russia   40 
 
267   
Kazakhstan 
 
  75 
 
266   
Tajikistan 
 
  
  
5   
Ukraine 
 
  362 
 
    
  
 
  
  
    
Madagascar 
South 
Africa   18 
 
78   
Malawi 
 
  19 
 
25   
Mauritius 
 
  263 
 
21   
Mozambique 
 
  42 
 
623   
Namibia     45   176   
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VI. Final Remarks 
This article has shown that there is a simultaneity between low records achieved by regional 
integration process in Latin America in recent years and the lack of clarity with regard to sound 
economic motives to foster this process.  
It has argued that one possible reason is that efforts have been made to deal at once and acording to 
the same conditions with different situations. Some kind of ´variable geometry` approach, taking into 
account what can be achieved via negotiations with different potential partners might provide more 
substantive results. 
This was done by showing in a taxonomic perspective the outcomes that can be expected from 
negotiations with different partners, according to their geographic distance. 
This article has put emphasis on the benefits that can accrue from deepening the integration process 
with neighbouring economies, using as a reference the impressive results obtained in recent years in 
East Asia. Productive complementarity allows for higher competitiveness at the same time that 
increased the convergence of GDP growth rates of the countries in that region. 
It was shown also that this complementarity has been achieved thanks to competitive advantages of 
the participating economies but also due to preferential tariff treatment to the neighbouring countries.  
From a Latin America perspective this is a challenge and an example. Latin American producers of 
manufactures have being losing market share both domestically and in traditional export markets, and 
need to react somehow. At the same time the East Asian experience in promoting productive 
complementarity might be seen as an example for groups of (geographically close) Latin American 
countries. This dimension should be included more explicitly and intensely in the regional negotiating 
agenda. 
At the same time, from the perspective of exploiting the dynamic Asian markets the indications of 
trade diversion are suggestive of the need to include trade policy issues in the negotiating agenda, for 
instance, of the BRICS. To the extent that the BRICS intensify their regional links this issue will, of 
course, gain importance. 
It is time for Latin American economies to re-define their approach to regional integration on a new 
basis, taking into account a number of recent features in the international scenario. This article has 
contributed by raising a number of relevant issues that have so far been less considered in the 
traditional negotiating processes. 
